Determined to Come Most Freely
It is commonly held that Calvinism is committed to theological determinism, and therefore also to compatibilism insofar as Calvinism affirms human freedom and moral responsibility. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, opening up space for a form of Calvinism that allows for libertarian free...
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2017
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| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of reformed theology
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 11, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 272-297 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | KDD Ευαγγελική Εκκλησία NBE Ανθρωπολογία ΝΒΚ Σωτηριολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Calvinism
determinism
free will
incompatibilism
libertarianism
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| Σύνοψη: | It is commonly held that Calvinism is committed to theological determinism, and therefore also to compatibilism insofar as Calvinism affirms human freedom and moral responsibility. Recent scholarship has challenged this view, opening up space for a form of Calvinism that allows for libertarian free will. In this article we critically assess two versions of ‘libertarian Calvinism’ recently proposed by Oliver Crisp. We contend that Calvinism (defined along the confessional lines adopted by Crisp) is implicitly committed to theological determinism, and even if it were not so committed, it would still rule out libertarian free will on other grounds. |
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| Φυσική περιγραφή: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 1569-7312 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: Journal of reformed theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15697312-01103016 |
