The End of Eternity
A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events, thereby begging the question against opponents. Rejecting this assu...
| Pubblicato in: | Sophia |
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| Autore principale: | |
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Netherlands
[2017]
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| In: |
Sophia
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | NBD Creazione VB Ermeneutica; Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Infinity
B Cosmological Argument B Eternity B Kalām |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise (what I call the Impossible Formation Argument, IFA) illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events, thereby begging the question against opponents. Rejecting this assumption, opponents say, eliminates any objections to the possibility that the past is infinitely old and undermines the IFAs ability to support premise 2. I contend that the plausibility of this objection depends on ambiguities in extant formulations of the IFA and that we may resolve these ambiguities in a way that does not presuppose a finite staring point. I also argue that this disambiguation allows us to construct an argument demonstrating that the concept of an infinite past entails a contradiction. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0590-0 |