Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine

In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Johnson, David Kyle (Author)
Outros Autores: Perrine, Timothy (Bibliographic antecedent)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado em: Springer Netherlands [2017]
Em: Sophia
Ano: 2017, Volume: 56, Número: 2, Páginas: 367-371
Classificações IxTheo:AB Filosofia da religião
NBC Deus
VB Hermenêutica ; Filosofia
Outras palavras-chave:B Atheism
B Bayes Theorem
B Skeptical theism
Acesso em linha: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descrição
Resumo:In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesn’t always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden.
ISSN:1873-930X
Reference:Kritik von "A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’ (2015)"
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4