Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine

In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Johnson, David Kyle (Autore)
Altri autori: Perrine, Timothy (Antecedente bibliografico)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
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Pubblicazione: Springer Netherlands [2017]
In: Sophia
Anno: 2017, Volume: 56, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 367-371
Notazioni IxTheo:AB Filosofia delle religioni
NBC Dio
VB Ermeneutica; Filosofia
Altre parole chiave:B Atheism
B Bayes Theorem
B Skeptical theism
Accesso online: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
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Riepilogo:In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesn’t always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden.
ISSN:1873-930X
Riferimento:Kritik von "A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’ (2015)"
Comprende:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4