Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine

In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Johnson, David Kyle (Autor)
Otros Autores: Perrine, Timothy (Antecedente bibliográfico)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado: Springer Netherlands [2017]
En: Sophia
Año: 2017, Volumen: 56, Número: 2, Páginas: 367-371
Clasificaciones IxTheo:AB Filosofía de la religión
NBC Dios
VB Hermenéutica ; Filosofía
Otras palabras clave:B Atheism
B Bayes Theorem
B Skeptical theism
Acceso en línea: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descripción
Sumario:In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesn’t always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden.
ISSN:1873-930X
Reference:Kritik von "A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’ (2015)"
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4