Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions
This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursu...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2016]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 55, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 215-236 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCC Κοινωνική Ηθική NCD Πολιτική Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία ZC Πολιτική |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Difference Principle
B John Rawls B Publicity B Virtue B Equality B G.A. Cohen |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens (NTMs). Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9 |
