Gossip as a Burdened Virtue
Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or le...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2017]
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Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 20, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 473-487 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCB Ατομική Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία ZD Ψυχολογία |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Burdened virtue
B Gossip B Social epistemology B Virtue B Reputation |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Σύνοψη: | Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or less likely to believe the gossip. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, we contend that gossip may be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9809-y |