On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress*
The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of evaluative moral progress-claims, and outlines a possible novel anal...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2017, Volume: 20, Issue: 1, Pages: 137-152 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Value incomparability
B Moral Progress B Value comparisons B Betterness B Value dualism |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of evaluative moral progress-claims, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a (quasi) descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and 6 outline the ambiguous character of making moral progress. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9747-0 |