A Working Definition of Moral Progress
Essentially everyone agrees that the outlawing of slavery, or the beginning of womens suffrage, or the defeat of Nazism constitute paradigmatic examples of moral progress in human history. But this consensus belies a deep division about the nature of moral progress more generally, a consequence of...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
[2017]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2017, Volume: 20, Issue: 1, Pages: 75-92 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy ZB Sociology ZD Psychology |
Further subjects: | B
Subjective well-being
B Ethics B Happiness B Moral Progress B Population welfare |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Essentially everyone agrees that the outlawing of slavery, or the beginning of womens suffrage, or the defeat of Nazism constitute paradigmatic examples of moral progress in human history. But this consensus belies a deep division about the nature of moral progress more generally, a consequence of the foundational differences among and within normative traditions regarding the nature and scope of the moral in moral progress. This essay proposes that philosophers might nonetheless converge on a working definition of moral progress by identifying a proxy property that reliably tracks moral progress, but which does not purport to be coextensive with the philosophically-relevant property. The aim of this essay is to identify this proxy property with emerging empirical measures of population welfare, and to show why this indicator of moral progress can garner overlapping consensus from a variety of normative traditions. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9753-2 |