Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint
Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesnt repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwalls second-person...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2016, Volume: 19, Fascicolo: 5, Pagine: 1309-1323 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCB Etica individuale VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Forgiveness
B Darwall B Reactive attitudes B Second-person standpoint |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesnt repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwalls second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9740-7 |
