Is there a Rawlsian Argument for Animal Rights?
Mark Rowlands defends a Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlandss argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance,...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 973-984 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCG Environmental ethics; Creation ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
John Rawls
B Mark Rowlands B Animal Rights B Contractualism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Mark Rowlands defends a Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlandss argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance, according to which we cannot know whether we are human or non-human on the other side of the veil. Rowlands claims that his interpretation of the veil is more consistent with a core commitment of Rawlsian justicethe intuitive equality principlethan either Rawls or his critics realize. Here I argue that Rawls is not committed to the intuitive equality principle, as Rowlands articulates it, and hence Rowlandss argument is in fact only superficially Rawlsian. Furthermore, Rowlandss intuitive equality principle is dubious on its own terms, and thus a poor principle on which to base a case for animal rights. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9702-0 |