Jealousy Revisited: Recent Philosophical Work on a Maligned Emotion
Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticea...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
[2016]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, Pages: 741-754 |
IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
Further subjects: | B
Moral Justification
B Deservingness B Conceptual Analysis B Jealousy B Aristotle |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While the essential contours of the new model are rejected, Fredericks is shown to offer some powerful misgivings about putative instrumentalist defences of jealousy. In addition to this new model, a number of other recent writings about jealousy - historical, conceptual and moral - are subjected to critical scrutiny in this overview article. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9668-3 |