One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary
De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agents conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for respo...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2017, Volume: 20, Issue: 2, Pages: 223-237 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Moral inquiry
B Thin concepts B Brian Weatherson B De dicto desire B Fetishism B Michael Smith B Moral uncertainty B Moral Motivation |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agents conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner (relative to her epistemic state) in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are (1) the appropriateness of the agents uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and (2) the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smiths (1994) argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weathersons (2014) argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9742-5 |