Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kants Categorical Imperative?
Kants moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2015]
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| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2015, Volume: 18, Número: 3, Páginas: 595-614 |
| Classificações IxTheo: | NCA Ética TJ Idade Moderna VA Filosofia |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Ethics
B Deontology B Positive duties B Categorical Imperative B Negative duties B Kant |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | Kants moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4 |
