Rational Cooperation and the Nash Bargaining Solution
In a recent article, McClennen (Synthese 187:65-93, 2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected i...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 3, Pages: 577-594 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCC Social ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
instrumental rationality
B (Strict) Pareto-optimality B Equality B (Stabilized) Nash bargaining solution B Full rationality B Reasonableness |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In a recent article, McClennen (Synthese 187:65-93, 2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected individual utility maximizing behavior that underlies the Nash bargaining model in favor of what he calls full rationality, and McClennens full cooperation bargaining theory demands that agents select the most egalitarian strictly Pareto-optimal distributional outcome that is strictly Pareto-superior to the state of nature. I argue that McClennens full cooperators are best described as reasonable agents whose rationality is constrained by moral considerations and that McClennens bargaining theory is moralized in this regard. If, by contrast, the orthodox concept of rationality is assumed and plausible assumptions are made about human nature and social cooperation, then a modified version of the standard Nash bargaining solution, which I call the stabilized Nash bargaining solution (Moehler in Utilitas 22:447-473, 2010), is justified. From the perspective of rational agents, the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can accommodate McClennens criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution in the context of the social contract and, for such agents, it can serve as a principle of distributive justice in deeply morally pluralistic societies. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9 |