Ethics and Value in Naess’ Ecophilosophy
It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficie...
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 載入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2017
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| In: |
Worldviews
Year: 2017, 卷: 21, 發布: 3, Pages: 251-261 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Næss, Arne 1912-2009
/ Fox, Warwick 1954-
/ 深層生態學
/ 倫理學
/ 道德
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics NCG Environmental ethics; Creation ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Ethics
ontological presuppositions of Naess’ philosophy
realist notion value
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| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| 總結: | It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficiently accounted for in Naess’ ecophilosophy, namely its ontological presuppositions. To be philosophically sound, Naess’ criticisms of ethics need to question the taboo against the so-called naturalistic fallacy, a commonplace in ethical theories since Hume. I argue that a realist notion of value—understood as a property of nature, operative in nature—provides ecophilosophy with a sorely needed ontological foundation. |
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| 實物描述: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 1568-5357 |
| Contains: | In: Worldviews
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685357-02103004 |
