On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism

The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the ske...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Lee, Kok Yong (Verfasst von)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
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Veröffentlicht: 2017
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2017, Band: 7, Heft: 3, Seiten: 173-198
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Skeptizismus / Epistemische Logik
weitere Schlagwörter:B epistemic contextualism standards variantism position variantism skepticism pragmatic penetration intellectualism
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Zusammenfassung:The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings.
Physische Details:Online-Ressource
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001224