How not to Argue from Science to Skepticism
For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fashionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepticism about human knowledge. I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and scientifically informed...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2014
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 4, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 21-35 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Skepticism
knowledge
science
appearance
eliminativism
underdetermination
veil of perception
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fashionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepticism about human knowledge. I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and scientifically informed common sense. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-03031081 |