TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF ANTINOMIES IN MAX SCHELER’S VALUE THEORY
Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads hi...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2012
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| Στο/Στη: |
Philosophia reformata
Έτος: 2012, Τόμος: 77, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 93-113 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| Σύνοψη: | Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads him to misidentify the value attaching to personal agency exclusively with moral value. To resolve these problems, I enlist Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of experiential aspects, analogical concepts, and subject-object relations, which illumine both Scheler’s insights and his oversights. |
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| Φυσική περιγραφή: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000528 |
