TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF ANTINOMIES IN MAX SCHELER’S VALUE THEORY

Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads hi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Blosser, Philip (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: 2012
In: Philosophia reformata
Year: 2012, Volume: 77, Issue: 2, Pages: 93-113
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
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Summary:Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads him to misidentify the value attaching to personal agency exclusively with moral value. To resolve these problems, I enlist Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of experiential aspects, analogical concepts, and subject-object relations, which illumine both Scheler’s insights and his oversights.
Physical Description:Online-Ressource
ISSN:2352-8230
Contains:In: Philosophia reformata
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000528