TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF ANTINOMIES IN MAX SCHELER’S VALUE THEORY
Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads hi...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2012
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| In: |
Philosophia reformata
Year: 2012, Volume: 77, Issue: 2, Pages: 93-113 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| Summary: | Two problems in Scheler’s thought are (1) his reason/feeling dualism, which artificially limits his classification of values, undermining the coherence of experience and its rational intelligibility; and (2) his restriction of moral value to a by-product of realizing non-moral values, which leads him to misidentify the value attaching to personal agency exclusively with moral value. To resolve these problems, I enlist Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of experiential aspects, analogical concepts, and subject-object relations, which illumine both Scheler’s insights and his oversights. |
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| Physical Description: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Contains: | In: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000528 |
