DEFENDING DESIGN ARGUMENTS AGAINST PLANTINGA
This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2014
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| In: |
Philosophia reformata
Year: 2014, Volume: 79, Issue: 1, Pages: 54-65 |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments. |
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| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Contains: | In: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000562 |