The Agrippan Problem, Then and Now

Skeptical arguments (or problems) fall into two categories: “Agrippan” and “Cartesian.” The former revolve around what is commonly thought of today as the problem of the regress of justification; the latter make essential use of skeptical hypotheses. Cartesian arguments have no place in Pyrrhonian s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Williams, Michael (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2015
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 2, Pages: 80-106
Further subjects:B Agrippan Problem epistemic quietism Pyrrhonism regress skeptical assent skeptical stance standard model
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)

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