HOW NOT TO BE AN ANTI-REALIST: HABERMAS, TRUTH, AND JUSTIFICATION
This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas’s “pragmatic rea...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2012
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In: |
Philosophia reformata
Year: 2012, Volume: 77, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-18 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas’s “pragmatic realist” conception. By critically appropriating Habermas’s insights, I aim to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute, replacing questions of independence with questions of interdependence. I claim that truth theory needs to begin with the interdependence of “mind” and “object” and with the corporeal multidimensionality of both human knowers and that about which they acquire knowledge. |
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ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
Contains: | In: Philosophia reformata
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000520 |