Secularism in Crisis: The Indian State’s Codification of Muslim Personal Law and the Relegation of Muslim Women’s Rights
In academic writings on multiculturalism in India the “Shah Bano controversy” (1985-1986) has been a much cited example of the incompatibility between gender equality and cultural diversity. As a response to the Supreme Court’s Shah Bano verdict in 1985, the then Congress-led Indian government intro...
| Subtitles: | Managing religious diversity in India, China and Canada |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Sage
[2016]
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| In: |
Studies in religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 45, Issue: 4, Pages: 520-541 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In academic writings on multiculturalism in India the “Shah Bano controversy” (1985-1986) has been a much cited example of the incompatibility between gender equality and cultural diversity. As a response to the Supreme Court’s Shah Bano verdict in 1985, the then Congress-led Indian government introduced the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. In this article, I analyze the parliamentary debates on the aforementioned Act in order to examine the dominant normative vocabulary of the Indian state in debating the issue of religious freedom versus demands for democratic citizenship rights. Such an exercise sheds light on how the Indian state has reconciled group-differentiated rights - the legal recognition of Muslim Personal Law in this case - with the liberal democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution of India. The analysis of the parliamentary debates on the Muslim Women’s Bill shows, firstly, that when purportedly incommensurable demands of gender-justice and religious freedom come to an elected deliberative forum, it is not necessary that such demands are resolved through “consensus” or through “negotiation and compromise,” as has been argued by multicultural theorists. Secondly, the analysis of the parliamentary debates also demonstrates that while the proponents of the Bill prioritized group rights at the expense of individual rights, the opponents neglected the concern that vulnerable minority groups should be accorded differential treatment. I thus contend that both the proponents and the opponents of the Muslim Women’s Bill in the Parliament argued in terms of formal equality and lacked arguments based on substantive equality. Finally, I argue that although the Congress government prioritized group rights in the parliamentary debates, it did not give up the ideal of a common civil code, such that the government left the question of accommodating gender-equality concerns unresolved. It was thus left to the judiciary to determine whether to further entrench legal pluralism in the family law of India. |
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| ISSN: | 2042-0587 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Studies in religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0008429816655573 |