The Problem of “God” in Psychology of Religion: Lonergan's “Common Sense” (Religion) Versus “Theory” (Theology)
The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine-versus-natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinion...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
[2017]
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In: |
Zygon
Year: 2017, Volume: 52, Issue: 2, Pages: 380-418 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Lonergan, Bernard J. F. 1904-1984
/ Religious psychology
/ God
/ Theism
/ Supranaturalism
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AE Psychology of religion |
Further subjects: | B
hypothesis of God
B possibility of human science B theistic psychology B postmodern agnosticism B Theory B Common sense B implicit definition B Council of Nicaea B Supernatural B Bernard J. F. Lonergan |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine-versus-natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God-hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so-named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine-versus-natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12345 |