Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131-151, ) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom ( CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the conte...
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2015
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, 卷: 77, 发布: 3, Pages: 231-246 |
| Further subjects: | B
Molinism
B Consequence argument B FREE will & determinism B Accidental necessity B Argument B Libertarianism B Compatibilism B Grace (Theology) B Middle Knowledge |
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Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131-151, ) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom ( CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the contemporary debate, ) has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga's understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk's challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9473-2 |