An epistemic argument for tolerance
In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be will...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
[2016]
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In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2015, Volume: 76, Issue: 5, Pages: 428-435 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Religion
/ Justification (Philosophy)
/ Religious tolerance
/ Bi-valence
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AX Inter-religious relations |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In this paper I first take a critical look at Grube’s allegiance to the idea that bivalence should be rejected as it can serve the cause of religious toleration. I argue that bivalence is not what Grube says it is, and that rejection of bivalence comes at a very high price that we should not be willing to pay. Next I analyze Grube’s argument for religious toleration - an argument that does not involve the rejection of bivalence. I argue that the argument is unconvincing because there exists no relation between epistemic justification and toleration. (I also note problems with the notion of "justification" as used by Grube.) |
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ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
Reference: | Kritik von "Justified religious difference (2016)"
Kritik in "Reply to the respondents to "Justified religious difference: a constructive approach to religious diversity" (2016)" |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2015.1133315 |