Response to Ranganathan
This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Imprimé Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2014]
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| Dans: |
Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2014, Volume: 42, Numéro: 4, Pages: 776-782 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Droit de l’homme
/ Dignité humaine
/ Religion
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| Classifications IxTheo: | AB Philosophie de la religion NCC Éthique sociale VA Philosophie |
| Édition parallèle: | Électronique
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| Résumé: | This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence). |
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| ISSN: | 0384-9694 |
| Référence: | Kritik von "Should inherent human dignity be considered intrinsically heuristic? (2014)"
Kritik von "The concept of dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2011)" |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
|
