Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Dualismus in Griechenland
One of the most fascinating questions in the history and phenomenology of antique religions is the comparison of different conceptions of dualism found in them. Iran was characterized by the notion of a dualism founded on the partial symmetry of two coeternal principles (light vs. darkness, in Zoroa...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2012
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| In: |
Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft
Year: 1993, Volume: 1, Issue: 2, Pages: 3-12 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | One of the most fascinating questions in the history and phenomenology of antique religions is the comparison of different conceptions of dualism found in them. Iran was characterized by the notion of a dualism founded on the partial symmetry of two coeternal principles (light vs. darkness, in Zoroastrianism, Manicheism or radically dualistic Catharists). Whereas, Greek dualism was particularly interested in anthropology (divine soul against material body) without neglecting cosmological presuppositions. A fundamental distinction between the two dualisms is that in the dualism of two coeternal principles, these are respectively compact and homogeneous by nature. On the contrary, Greek dualism is founded on the notion of a >gradated< ontological dignity of the different classes of entities found in the universe: those more divine or less divine and those more human or less human. The existence of this gradation is an ontological necessity in an universe which, according to Plato (>Timaios<), must be complete, that is, completing in itself the two realms: the ideal and the corporeal. On the other hand, this graduality is not devoid of ethical motivation, manifesting itself through the different >punishments< of the incarnate souls. Accordingly, a distinction must be made between an evil conceived as an ontological defectus boni, that is, inscribed in the very nature of a being and an ethical evil, coming into existence as the result of a bad choice on the part of man or of soul. This means that dualism (which, according to its definition is always ontological and not simply ethical) does not necessarily imply the >Iranian< radical notion of the two coeternal principles (evil as an evil substance coeternal with good). There is also al less radical form of dualism where evil consists of a gradated ontological defectiveness. |
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| Physical Description: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 2194-508X |
| Contains: | In: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1515/0019.3 |