RT Article
T1 Engaging Jeffrey Koperski’s decretalism: is occasionalism really avoidable?
JF Religious studies
VO 62
IS 1
SP 184
OP 196
A1 Muhtaroǧlu, Nazif
A1 Malik, Shoaib Ahmed
A2 Malik, Shoaib Ahmed
LA English
YR 2026
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1963557921
AB This article critically evaluates Jeffrey Koperski’s decretalism, which presents the laws of nature as divine decrees functioning as constraints rather than dynamic forces. Building on his work, we explore whether his model successfully avoids the implications of occasionalism, as he claims. By analysing his latest publications, we first reconstruct Koperski’s argument and then present three key objections. These include (1) issues related to scientific realism, (2) the principle of simplicity, and (3) the reduction of Koperski’s model to occasionalism. We argue that despite his attempts to distinguish his framework, Koperski’s model ultimately collapses into occasionalism due to the continuous divine sustenance required for natural processes. By engaging with recent developments in metaphysical and scientific debates, this article highlights the limitations of Koperski’s decretalism.
K1 Jeffrey Koperski
K1 Causality
K1 decretalism
K1 laws of nature
K1 Occasionalism
DO 10.1017/S0034412524000635