La abstracción formal y la validación del razonamiento inductivo
It is commonly accepted that the justification of inductive reasoning remains a problem ever since Hume’s critique. Neither empiricism or logical positivism, on the one hand, nor rationalism and idealism, on the other, have succeeded in solving this problem. We believe that the answer could be found...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Espagnol |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2007
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| Dans: |
Sapientia
Année: 2007, Volume: 62, Numéro: 221/222, Pages: 128-178 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Aristóteles, 384-322 a.C
B Abstraccion B Realismo B Hume, David, 1711-1776 B Metodo Inductivo B Filosofia De La Ciencia |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
