Giving Consent
By giving consent, we sometimes give permission or make it the case that we are not wronged. What does it take for an act to be an act of consent? This is the question this paper deals with. The question does not presuppose the view that consent is a communicative act. For those who take it as a men...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
|
| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2025, Volume: 22, Issue: 5/6, Pages: 618-635 |
| Further subjects: | B
wronging someone
B Consent B giving permission B normative powers |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000naa a22000002c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 1961160161 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20260216131128.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 260216s2025 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1163/17455243-20244386 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)1961160161 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1961160161 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 084 | |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |e VerfasserIn |0 (DE-588)11557767X |0 (DE-627)077340272 |0 (DE-576)16578248X |4 aut |a Schaber, Peter |d 1958- | |
| 109 | |a Schaber, Peter 1958- | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Giving Consent |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2025 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a By giving consent, we sometimes give permission or make it the case that we are not wronged. What does it take for an act to be an act of consent? This is the question this paper deals with. The question does not presuppose the view that consent is a communicative act. For those who take it as a mental state, the question is what does it take to express consent? It will be argued that an act is an act of consent if and only if the consent-giver believes she gives someone permission to do or omit something by performing the act. A normative intention is not required for consent. It is further argued that this view also bears on the question of what falls within the scope of consent and shows how it differs from the evidential account advocated by Tom Dougherty. I also argue that the view defended in this paper does not imply - as some think - that the consent-receiver could wrong the consent-giver without being able to know that this is the case. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Consent | |
| 650 | 4 | |a giving permission | |
| 650 | 4 | |a normative powers | |
| 650 | 4 | |a wronging someone | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of moral philosophy |d Leiden : Brill, 2004 |g 22(2025), 5/6, Seite 618-635 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)474382281 |w (DE-600)2169771-1 |w (DE-576)273875329 |x 1745-5243 |7 nnas |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:22 |g year:2025 |g number:5/6 |g pages:618-635 |
| 856 | |u https://brill.com/downloadpdf/view/journals/jmp/aop/article-10.1163-17455243-20244386/article-10.1163-17455243-20244386.pdf |x unpaywall |z Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang |h publisher [deprecated] | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/22/05-06/article-p618_004.xml |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |7 0 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20244386 |x Resolving-System |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |7 0 |
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| ELC | |a 1 | ||
| ITA | |a 1 |t 1 | ||
| LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
| LOK | |0 001 4918260659 | ||
| LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
| LOK | |0 004 1961160161 | ||
| LOK | |0 005 20260216130104 | ||
| LOK | |0 008 260216||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
| LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
| LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
| LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
| LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixzo | ||
| LOK | |0 939 |a 16-02-26 |b l01 | ||
| OAS | |a 1 | ||
| ORI | |a TA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw | ||
