Assessing Human Needs
This paper investigates the meaning of needs claims to determine conditions under which they can be falsified. Interpreting needs as necessary requirements, I consider two distinct versions of the statement “A needs X.” One is hypothetical: “If A is to do or obtain Y, then A needs X.” The other is c...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1990
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| In: |
Philosophy & theology
Jahr: 1990, Band: 5, Heft: 1, Seiten: 55-64 |
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Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper investigates the meaning of needs claims to determine conditions under which they can be falsified. Interpreting needs as necessary requirements, I consider two distinct versions of the statement “A needs X.” One is hypothetical: “If A is to do or obtain Y, then A needs X.” The other is categorical - “A needs X at hand” - and is derived from the hypothetical statement when A is in some manner to do Y. I argue that, despite some cases in which needs claims cannot be falsified, formal criteria can be adduced to falsify or, at least, challenge both versions of needs claims. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-828X |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Philosophy & theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/philtheol19905116 |
