When Suicide is not a Self-Killing: Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity—Part I

Derek Parfit’s view of ‘personal identity’ raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. Part I of this paper arg...

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Altri titoli:When Suicide is not a Self-Killing: Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity, Part 1
Autore principale: Dowie, Suzanne E. (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
Verificare la disponibilità: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Pubblicazione: 2025
In: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Anno: 2025, Volume: 34, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 455-466
Altre parole chiave:B advance decisions
B psychological continuity
B Suicide
B Parfit
B Personal Identity
Accesso online: Volltext (kostenfrei)
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520 |a Derek Parfit’s view of ‘personal identity’ raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. Part I of this paper argues that this assessment of personal identity undermines the distinction between suicide and homicide. However, rather than accept that an unknown metaphysical ‘further fact’ underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit’s view but offer a different account of what it implies morally: that the social and legal bases for ascribing a persisting ‘personal identity’ maintain the distinction between homicide and suicide. 
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