The concealed crime of the nad?tu priestess in §110 of the laws of Hammurabi
LH 110 is part of the ancient Near Eastern scholarly debate regarding the function and role of the nadi?tu-priestess groups in Old Babylonian society. Seemingly, LH 110 forbids the uncloistered nad?tu from opening up or entering a business place associated with the s?b?tu; the penalty for such a cri...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2015
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| In: |
Journal for semitics
Year: 2015, Volume: 24, Issue: 1, Pages: 109-145 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | LH 110 is part of the ancient Near Eastern scholarly debate regarding the function and role of the nadi?tu-priestess groups in Old Babylonian society. Seemingly, LH 110 forbids the uncloistered nad?tu from opening up or entering a business place associated with the s?b?tu; the penalty for such a crime is public execution by burning. Mainstream scholars view the nadi?tu through the lens of either (a) indulging in illicit behaviour or (b) that LH 110 reflects a prohibition for the nad?tu to compromise her chastity. In contrast, Martha Roth (1999) opines that LH 110 is an economic regulation of the nad?tu, prohibiting her from overshadowing the money-lending business of the s?b?tu. However, what poses a problem is the horrific penalty, which seems to suggest and be justification for a seemingly terrible crime committed in concealment. I propose that when this prohibition is transgressed, a horrific crime is committed - tax evasion - which is a furtive crime that endangers the continuous welfare of the king/state. LH 110 is a fiscal regulation protecting the state/king's revenues. The intention is to prevent a specific group of the nadi?tu â?? an uncloistered priestess - to enter or open an enterprise, which the OB state administration is unable to regulate. Consequently, the nad?tu could effortlessly conceal her yielded profits and thus evade paying tax to the king/state. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal for semitics
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| Persistent identifiers: | HDL: 10520/EJC174593 |
