Ontological conditions for non-evil

In this article three interlocking ontological prerequisites for a condition of non-evil are identified. The first is the idea of a plurality of human aspects and dimensions that give one another room to exist, instead of an oppressing reduction to one aspect only. Secondly, these aspects need to ex...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Heyns, M. (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: 2003
Em: Koers
Ano: 2003, Volume: 68, Número: 2/3, Páginas: 217-236
Outras palavras-chave:B Human Dimensions
B Wickedness
B Plurality
B Coherence
B Equality
B Evil And Cruelty
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Descrição
Resumo:In this article three interlocking ontological prerequisites for a condition of non-evil are identified. The first is the idea of a plurality of human aspects and dimensions that give one another room to exist, instead of an oppressing reduction to one aspect only. Secondly, these aspects need to exist next to one another as equally valued. This condition implies that even if a person lacks some aspect, she can still be affirmed as a human being because her humanity does not depend entirely or even mainly on the superiority of the missing aspect. Equality is, however, often interpreted as a homogenisation of all dimensions of life to one aspect only. This monism is a denial of variety and will only evoke its anti-pole in the form of a disengaged dualism or pluralism. I therefore argue that a third condition for the manifestation of a condition of non-evil is engagement between the aspects and dimensions of human life.
ISSN:2304-8557
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Koers
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.4102/koers.v68i2/3.336