A Dilemma for Buffered Alternatives

Frankfurt-style cases challenge the intuitively plausible “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (pap), which claims that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Most such cases have familiar responses by defenders of the pap, most notably the “dilemma defense” levied against tr...

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Autore principale: Paskell, Matthew (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
Verificare la disponibilità: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Pubblicazione: 2025
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Anno: 2025, Volume: 22, Fascicolo: 3/4, Pagine: 427-452
Altre parole chiave:B Free Will
B Frankfurt cases
B source theory
B principle of alternative possibilities
B leeway theory
Accesso online: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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