Do criminal politicians affect firm investment and value?: evidence from a regression discontinuity approach
We provide evidence on the effects of criminal/corrupt politicians on firm performance and investments in their constituencies. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we focus on close parliamentary elections in India to establish a causal link between election of criminal-politicians and firms&...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2024
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| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of business ethics
Έτος: 2025, Τόμος: 198, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 579-614 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Indian political economy
B D73 B Corruption B G30 B Political corruption B G38 B Elections B Corporate investments B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift B Rent-seeking B Criminal politicians B D70 B D72 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | We provide evidence on the effects of criminal/corrupt politicians on firm performance and investments in their constituencies. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we focus on close parliamentary elections in India to establish a causal link between election of criminal-politicians and firms' stock-market performance and investment decisions. Election of criminal-politicians leads to lower election-period and project-announcement stock-market returns for private-sector firms with economic ties to the district. There is a significant decline in total investment and employment by private-sector firms in criminal-politician districts. Interestingly, decline in private-sector investment is largely offset by a roughly equivalent increase in investment by state-owned firms. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-024-05738-4 |
