What is the Habermasian Perspective on New Genetic Technologies?
Twenty years have now passed since Jürgen Habermas published his only work on bioethics. This article has three main aims. First, to offer a comprehensive re-evaluation of The Future of Human Nature in light of the many critiques made of it. Second, to undertake a reconstruction of certain elements...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2024
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2024, Volume: 31, Issue: 2, Pages: 75-98 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Habermas, Jürgen 1929-, Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur
/ Genetic technology
/ Bioethics
/ Human being
/ Autonomy
/ Self-understanding
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCH Medical ethics NCJ Ethics of science TK Recent history VA Philosophy YA Natural sciences |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Twenty years have now passed since Jürgen Habermas published his only work on bioethics. This article has three main aims. First, to offer a comprehensive re-evaluation of The Future of Human Nature in light of the many critiques made of it. Second, to undertake a reconstruction of certain elements of the work. Third, to forge a ‘Habermasian perspective’ that draws not only from The Future of Human Nature but also from his influential theories, including those of modernity, social evolution, and his discourse theory of ethics. In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas opposes the selection and enhancement of genetic traits for non-therapeutic purposes, arguing that such practices undermine autonomy and, in turn, ‘humanity’s ethical self-understanding’. Although subject to vociferous critique, I argue that the argument from autonomy holds promise. However, for it to serve the role Habermas envisions, the impact of new genetic technologies on norms of socialization – specifically those related to individuation – must be brought to the fore. I reframe the argument by focusing on how processes of self-formation in future societies could differ radically from those in contemporary society. I also propose a further important shift: limiting objections to genetic technologies on the grounds of autonomy narrows the scope of what a Habermasian approach to normatively evaluating these technologies might offer. Departing from his original stance, the Habermasian perspective outlined here advocates a precautionary societal approach informed by key insights from his social and normative theories. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.31.2.3293675 |
