In What Sense are God of the Gaps Arguments Fallacious or Legitimate?

Theistic arguments which appeal to gaps in our scientific knowledge are frequently labelled 'God of the gaps' (GOG). While many regard such arguments as obviously fallacious (an argument from ignorance), some disagree. Drawing on critics and defenders, this article examines the logical val...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Preston, Pu Ji (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: 2024
En: Science & Christian belief
Año: 2024, Volumen: 36, Número: 2, Páginas: 159-187
Otras palabras clave:B denying the consequent
B BURDEN of proof
B LOGICAL fallacies
B Scientific Knowledge
B Argumento
B Darwinism
B Methodological Naturalism
B God of the gaps
B Diseño inteligente
B Miracles
B argument from ignorance
B logical fallacy
B Scientific Progress
B God
Acceso en línea: Volltext (Lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:Theistic arguments which appeal to gaps in our scientific knowledge are frequently labelled 'God of the gaps' (GOG). While many regard such arguments as obviously fallacious (an argument from ignorance), some disagree. Drawing on critics and defenders, this article examines the logical validity of GOG, stated in two distinct formulations: (1) It is not proven that 'God is active in this corner of nature' is false; therefore God is indeed here; (2) it is not proven that 'there is a natural cause for this event' is true; therefore there is no natural cause or explanation. The difference is more than semantic; while the perceived wisdom mostly targets the first version, recent advocates match the second more closely. Neither formulation of GOG is fallacious once the logical structures and implicit premises are identified; the first version is best categorized as an assertion of burden of proof, and the second an instance of denying the consequent. As their merits are assessed against well-known objections, the second version is found to be considerably stronger than the first. It can be a solid argument, assuming that its empirical premises are supported by strong evidence.
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Science & Christian belief