RT Article
T1 Hypocrisy and Epistemic Injustice
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 27
IS 3
SP 353
OP 370
A1 Carey, Brian
LA English
YR 2024
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1905110596
AB In this article I argue that we should understand some forms of hypocritical behaviour in terms of epistemic injustice; a type of injustice in which a person is wronged in their capacity as a knower. If each of us has an interest in knowing what morality requires of us, this can be undermined when hypocritical behaviour distorts our perception of the moral landscape by misrepresenting the demandingness of putative moral obligations. This suggests that a complete theory of the wrongness of hypocrisy must account for hypocrisy as epistemic injustice.
K1 Deception
K1 Demandingness
K1 Epistemic Injustice
K1 Hypocrisy
DO 10.1007/s10677-024-10442-3