RT Article
T1 Double-donor surrogacy and the intention to parent
JF Bioethics
VO 38
IS 7
SP 609
OP 615
A1 Baron, Teresa ca. 20./21. Jh.
LA English
YR 2024
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1897641737
AB Assisted reproduction often involves biological contributions by third parties such as egg/sperm donors, mitochondrial DNA donors, and surrogate mothers. However, these arrangements are also characterised by a biological relationship between the child and at least one intending parent. For example, one or both intending parents might use their own eggs/sperm in surrogacy, or an intending mother might conceive using donor sperm or gestate a donor embryo. What happens when this relationship is absent, as in the case of 'double-donor surrogacy' arrangements (DDS)? Here, a child is conceived using both donor eggs and sperm, carried by a surrogate, and raised by the commissioning parents. In this paper, I critically examine proposals to allow DDS in the United Kingdom, and the intentionalist justification for treating this practice distinctly (morally and legally speaking) from private adoption. I argue that the intentionalist approach cannot plausibly justify such a distinction and that other approaches to moral parenthood are also unlikely to succeed.
K1 Surrogacy
K1 Parents
K1 Intention
K1 Family
K1 Assisted Reproduction
DO 10.1111/bioe.13204