Does Practicality Support Noncognitivism?
Normative judgments are practical: they bear a close connection to motivation. Noncognitivists often claim that they have a distinctive explanatory advantage accounting for this connection. After all, if normative judgments just are noncognitive, desire-like states, then it is no mystery why they be...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
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| Published: |
Brill
2024
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2024, Volume: 21, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 249-269 |
| Further subjects: | B
Noncognitivism
B motivational internalism B Expressivism B Practicality |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
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| 520 | |a Normative judgments are practical: they bear a close connection to motivation. Noncognitivists often claim that they have a distinctive explanatory advantage accounting for this connection. After all, if normative judgments just are noncognitive, desire-like states, then it is no mystery why they bear an intimate connection to motivation: desire-like states motivate. In this paper, however, I argue that noncognitivism does not have this explanatory advantage after all. The problem is that noncognitivists cannot provide a characterization of the practicality of normative judgment that allows them to retain this advantage. Noncognitivists either posit a strong and controversial connection between normative judgment and motivation that cognitivists have no trouble rejecting, or they posit a weaker connection that cognitivists can explain just as well. Either way, noncognitivists cannot argue from the practicality of normative judgments to their claim that normative judgments are noncognitive, desire-like states. The practicality of normative judgments does not support noncognitivism. | ||
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