Early Biblical Fundamentalism’s Xenophobic Rejection of the Subject in European Philosophy: How Rejecting the Knowing Subject Formed Fundamentalism’s Way of Thinking
This article is part of a wider project that addresses gaps in the scholarly knowledge of the philosophical and theological foundations of the Biblical Fundamentalism that originated in North America. Through exploring the relevant literature, including primary sources from within Fundamentalism, th...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
MDPI
2024
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| In: |
Religions
Year: 2024, Volume: 15, Issue: 7 |
| Further subjects: | B
common sense philosophy
B Objectivity B Continental B Subjectivity B Fundamentalism B Philosophy B Biblical |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | This article is part of a wider project that addresses gaps in the scholarly knowledge of the philosophical and theological foundations of the Biblical Fundamentalism that originated in North America. Through exploring the relevant literature, including primary sources from within Fundamentalism, the article examines the anti-European sentiment in early Fundamentalism and how this sentiment led to a rejection of philosophical values associated with Europe, especially with Germany. The article will show that anti-European, especially anti-German, sentiment bolstered Fundamentalism’s rejection of subjectivity in thinking, and even its rejection of human subjects themselves. In the place of subjectivity associated with European philosophy, Fundamentalism embraced an extreme objectivity that claimed the heritage of Reid and Bacon but eliminated subjectivity from the Fundamentalist horizon. This article thus shows how Fundamentalism radically opposes God and human beings, and faith and philosophy, with the resulting way of thinking that can be characterised as “naïve realism”, an approach to thinking that excludes the active thinking subject and does not allow for critical judgement or personal understanding. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel15070790 |