Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of backg...
| Autori: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
|
| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2024, Volume: 27, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 203-220 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCA Etica VA Filosofia ZA Scienze sociali |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Norms of belief
B Doxastic affirmative action B Relational egalitarianism B Doxastic egalitarianism |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of the regard-requirement for relating as equals. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10408-x |
