Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of backg...
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| Другие авторы: | |
| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2024
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| В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2024, Том: 27, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 203-220 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCA Этика VA Философия ZA Общественные науки |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Norms of belief
B Doxastic affirmative action B Relational egalitarianism B Doxastic egalitarianism |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Итог: | According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of the regard-requirement for relating as equals. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10408-x |
