How to Define ‘Moral Realism’
The paper considers three possible definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good: (1) that it is overall important to do; (2) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principle; and (3) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principl...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2024
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In: |
New blackfriars
Year: 2024, Volume: 105, Issue: 2, Pages: 116-130 |
Further subjects: | B
universalisability
B Moral Realism B Moral Sense B Reflective Equilibrium B Terence Cuneo B moral goodness B Russ Shafer-Landau |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | The paper considers three possible definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good: (1) that it is overall important to do; (2) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principle; and (3) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principle, belonging to a system of such principles, which includes almost all of certain moral fixed points. I defend (3) and show how we can reach such a system, starting from the basic beliefs with which we find ourselves, through the process of reflective equilibrium. Moral realism is then the doctrine that there is such a system of true moral beliefs. My optimistic view is that all human communities could eventually reach the same such system. But, if they cannot, then there will be two (or more) different such systems, and so two (or more) different senses of ‘moral realism’. |
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ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/nbf.2023.22 |