For the Sake of Ourself: Eudaimonism, Friendship, and the Problem of Proprietary Beatitude
In this article, I defend Thomistic eudaimonism against John Hare's Kantian charge of unacceptable self-regard, and argue that Hare's own Scotistic-Kantian double-source theory of motivation introduces a problematic conception of beatitude. Hare argues that the beatitude which motivates th...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2023
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| Στο/Στη: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 36, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 582-603 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | ΚΑΕ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 900-1300, Ώριμος Μεσαίωνας KAJ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 1914-, Σύγχρονη Εποχή NBE Ανθρωπολογία NCA Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Friendship
B Eudaimonism B Aquinas B Scotus B Solidarity B Moral Motivation B Beatitude B Kant |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this article, I defend Thomistic eudaimonism against John Hare's Kantian charge of unacceptable self-regard, and argue that Hare's own Scotistic-Kantian double-source theory of motivation introduces a problematic conception of beatitude. Hare argues that the beatitude which motivates the will in Thomistic eudaimonism is a self-indexed good, which cannot motivate truly altruistic action. Hare fails to recognize that the beatitude that ultimately motivates the human will according to Thomas can be an ‘ourself-indexed’ rather than merely a ‘myself-indexed’ good, as the love of friendship brings other selves into the will's self-intention, facilitating a truly intersubjective and communal beatitude. Rejecting beatitude as the sole motivation of the will, Hare proposes a Scotistic double-source theory of motivation where the beatitude of another and the agent's own beatitude can never be loved with one and the same affection of the will, rendering beatitude unacceptably exclusive and proprietary. By making this argument, I hope to show that contemporary debates concerning moral motivation should carefully consider whether they can account for the intersubjective beatitude that bolsters human solidarity and forms the object of hope given by Christ who wills that his joy may be in us. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/09539468231164331 |