Moral feelings, moral reality, and moral progress
This volume presents two closely related essays by Thomas Nagel: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge," discusses the value of intuitions in understanding human rights and argues against subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality of the kind offered by evolutionary psychology or based...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic/Print Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subito Delivery Service: | Order now. |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| WorldCat: | WorldCat |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2023]
|
| In: | Year: 2023 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Morals
/ Knowledge
/ Emotion
|
| Further subjects: | B
Collection of essays
B Ethics B Moral Realism B Knowledge, Theory of B Emotions (Philosophy) |
| Online Access: |
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Aggregator) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | This volume presents two closely related essays by Thomas Nagel: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge," discusses the value of intuitions in understanding human rights and argues against subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality of the kind offered by evolutionary psychology or based on brain scans. The second essay, "Moral Reality and Moral Progress," proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments. The result is that only some advances in moral knowledge are discoveries of what has been true all along. "This book consists of two essays that are related to each other: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge" and "Moral Reality and Moral Progress." The longer second essay has not been previously published. Both are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments"-- |
|---|---|
| Item Description: | Literaturangaben in Fußnoten, mit Register |
| ISBN: | 0197690882 |
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197690888.001.0001 |