How (and How Not) to Defend Lesser-Evil Options

Many philosophers believe in lesser-evil justifications for doing harm: if the only way to stop a trolley from killing five is to divert it away onto one, then we may divert. But recently, Helen Frowe has argued that we do not only have the option to pursue the lesser evil: in most cases, we are so...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gordon-Solmon, Kerah (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2023
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2023, Volume: 20, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 211-232
Further subjects:B nonconsequentialism
B prerogatives
B permissible moral mistakes
B parity
B lesser-evil justifications
B constraints
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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