Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism
I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Anno: 2023, Volume: 13, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 105-119 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
seeming
B epistemic intuition B Particularism B commonsense B Skepticism |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10046 |
